




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Freedom, the State, and Revolution: The Ideological Confrontation Between Marx and Engels and Anarchist Thought

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Abstract

In the 19th century, as socialist movements proliferated across Europe, anarchism emerged as both a theoretic al and political adversary to Marxism. This paper critically examines the ideological divergences between Marx and Engels and two key figures in anarchist thought—Max Stirner and Mikhail Bakunin. Stirner's egoist anarchism, rooted in philosophical idealism, is analyzed and contrasted with Marx's materialist conception of the individual and freedom. Bakunin's political anarchism, which advocated the immediate abolition of the state, is likewise critiqued through the lens of historical materialism and proletarian revolution. Drawing upon textual analysis and modern theoretical perspectives, the paper reveals how Marx and Engels defended a historically grounded path to liberation in opposition to anarchism's abstract and often utopian notions of freedom. Ultimately, the Marxist critique not only refutes the ideological premises of anarchism but also articulates a revolutionary praxis rooted in class struggle and collective emancipation.

Keywords: Historical Materialism; Anarchism; Marx and Engels; Stirner; Bakunin; Revolution

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1. Introduction

Amidst the surging waves of the 19th-century socialist movement, the disillusionment with utopian socialism and liberalism prompted representatives from various social classes to formulate their own ideological doctrines in pursuit of historical influence. It was in this context that anarchism emerged as a distinct political ideology. From Max Stirner's radical individualism, which positioned the "Unique One" as the supreme subject, anarchism took shape as a philosophical rejection of all forms of authority and the state, and later evolved into more militant forms of political action.

Stirner's assertion of absolute individual freedom laid a subjectivist and idealist foundation for early anarchism, earning him the reputation of a conceptual "origin figure" in its intellectual history. For the young Marx, his critique of *The Ego and Its Own* marked a decisive turn toward materialism and scientific socialism. However, Marx's engagement with Stirner did not end there; his sustained critique of petty-bourgeois notions of freedom continued, particularly through his decades-long confrontation with the activist anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who radicalized Stirner's ideas and mobilized them as a revolutionary program.

Within the First International, the conflict between Bakunin and Marx spanned nearly thirty years, not as a mere struggle for organizational control, but as a profound theoretical clash over three central concepts: liberty, the state, and revolutionary strategy. This confrontation remains one of the most emblematic ideological oppositions between Marxism and anarchism. As Szűcs (2024) argues, anarchism—when divorced from historical and material conditions—risks devolving into hollow rhetoric about "freedom." Dunayevskaya (2024) similarly warns that genuine liberty must be realized through historical practice, not metaphysical speculation.

Tarrit (2024) further reinforces that socialism and liberty are not inherently opposed, but must be historically articulated through class struggle and collective praxis. In today's context of resurgent neoliberalism, anti-establishment movements, and the political delegitimization of the state, revisiting this debate is not merely of historical interest but offers critical tools to interrogate contemporary ideological fractures and modes of mass mobilization. Huey and Ferguson (2025), in their analysis of right-wing anti-authoritarian populism, demonstrate how distorted ideas of "freedom" can be mobilized in regressive ways—further validating the urgency of this theoretical confrontation.

This study, therefore, aims to analyze the intellectual trajectory of Stirner and Bakunin while examining Marx and Engels's multi-dimensional critique of anarchism. It emphasizes how historical materialism, grounded in "real individuals," "social praxis," and "structural analysis," counters the idealized and abstract narratives of freedom promoted by anarchist thought.

2. Max Stirner's Egoist Anarchism

Max Stirner, a member of the "Free Ones" circle led by the Bauer brothers within the Young Hegelians, actively participated in philosophical and political debates in mid-19th-century Germany. His 1844 publication *The Ego and Its Own* caused a considerable stir within German intellectual circles. Building on Hegelian metaphysics only to dismantle it, Stirner launched a radical critique of prevailing philosophical doctrines through the lens of egoism. He dismissed all external ideologies—religion, morality, ethics, the state—as "spooks" or "sacred objects," which, he claimed, enslave the individual. His goal was the complete emancipation of the "I," achieved through the destruction of these abstractions and the elevation of the individual will as the sole principle of action.

2.1 The Egoist Foundation of Stirner's Anarchism

Stirner drew upon Fichte's "philosophy of action" and Bauer's concept of "self-consciousness," but shifted the focus to the sensuous, embodied individual. He proposed the supremacy of the "Unique One," a subject not bound by reason, universality, or societal obligation. This shift from the universal to the particular, from the "species-being" to the isolated individual, resulted in a political and ethical framework characterized by extreme egoism and anarchism.

In *The Ego and Its Own*, Stirner criticizes Feuerbach's humanism for replacing the worship of God with the worship of humanity—merely substituting one oppressive abstraction for another. For Stirner, true freedom means rejecting all forms of subordination. "Everything in the world," he writes, "that restricts personal freedom and opposes the interest of the Unique One—be it the state, nation, family, law, or morality—must be ruthlessly cast aside." He asserts, "I do not act in the name of God or Man, but solely for myself." The measure of one's freedom, he argues, lies in one's ability to appropriate the world as one's property. Any means—violence, persuasion, deceit, manipulation—are legitimate so long as they serve the will of the egoist.

This conception, while radical, fails to address the socio-economic and institutional structures that condition freedom. As Øversveen (2022) notes, Stirner's theory neglects how alienation is produced within capitalist systems and how individual appropriation is structurally limited by class, labor relations, and material inequality. In this light, Stirner's ideal of "appropriating the world" becomes a metaphysical fantasy disconnected from lived realities.

2.2 Nihilistic Tendencies in Stirner's Conception of Freedom

Stirner's anarchism also exhibits strong nihilistic tendencies. He opposes all universals—not only the state or the nation, but also concepts such as truth, morality, and justice. For him, these are merely oppressive constructs that hinder individual authenticity. To escape subjugation, one must return to the "creative nothing," which serves as both the foundation and the void from which the ego creates meaning.

However, this absolute negation results in ontological and social atomization. The "Unique One" becomes unrelatable and uncooperative, rendering collective life impossible. As Engels observed, Stirner's philosophy elevates the "Unique One" above even self-consciousness, making him a prophetic figure of modern anarchism—but one ultimately incapable of proposing viable forms of social existence.

Suissa (2024), examining contemporary anarchist pedagogy, warns of the same paradox: that anarchism grounded purely in individual negation struggles to imagine real collective alternatives. Stirner's vision reduces freedom to solipsistic autonomy, stripping it of relational depth or institutional mediations.

2.3 The Illusion of the "Union of Egoists"

Stirner proposes the "Union of Egoists" as a voluntary association free from state coercion and moral obligation. He envisions it as a fluid collective of individuals bound only by mutual interest and personal gain. Once that interest ceases, any participant is free to abandon the union—there is no duty, no loyalty, no enduring solidarity.

This framework challenges traditional notions of social contract theory, but it is deeply flawed. As Block (2021) argues, Marxist theory conceives of the state

not as an illusion or moral fiction but as an apparatus shaped by the material interests of ruling classes and embedded in social reproduction. Stirner's rejection of the state and all collective structures overlooks their historical and material foundations. The "Union of Egoists" offers no mechanism to manage common needs, redistribute resources, or address structural injustice.

Stirner's ideal ultimately collapses under its own abstraction. It denies the necessity of shared commitments and collective responsibility, replacing them with transactional self-interest. As Øversveen (2022) points out, any theory of freedom that ignores material alienation and power asymmetries becomes complicit in perpetuating them. The result is a utopia of solitary egos—more fantasy than politics.

3. Mikhail Bakunin's Political Anarchism

While Max Stirner emerged as a rebel within the realm of ideas, Mikhail Bakunin appeared on the stage of history as an activist in revolutionary practice. As Engels noted, "It was Bakunin who resurrected Stirner... without Bakunin's incorporation of much of Stirner's idea of 'revolt,' the doctrine of modern anarchism would not exist" (Engels, 1873). Influenced by both Stirner's egoism and radical liberalism, Bakunin believed that the proletariat must become the subject of history through acts of spontaneous insurrection and political violence. He advocated replacing organized labor's economic and political struggle with direct action and even criminal violence, undermining the legitimacy of the socialist movement and offering ammunition for state repression.

3.1 From Anti-Theism to Political Anarchism

Bakunin's anarchism was rooted in anti-theism. He

opposed the concept of God as inherently degrading to human dignity. In a reversal of Voltaire's dictum, Bakunin claimed: "If God really existed, it would be necessary to abolish him," because divinity inherently corrupts human freedom. From this metaphysical rejection, he derived a political theory in which the abolition of divine authority must be mirrored by the destruction of all earthly political authority. As God's rule denies heavenly liberty, so too does the state repress human freedom. Thus, his anti-theism gave rise to a radical anti-statism: a complete abolition of all forms of power and coercion.

3.2 The Doctrine of Absolute Personal Freedom

At the core of Bakunin's anarchism lies the doctrine of absolute personal liberty. Drawing from abstract bourgeois conceptions of human nature, he envisioned the evolution of humanity from animality to rational moral agency. Freedom, he asserted, is the fundamental condition of human dignity: the right to act according to one's beliefs without external restraint. For Bakunin, liberty is innate, sacred, and inviolable—it is not the beginning of history, but its culmination and purpose. All historical and political decisions must be judged against the criterion of whether they violate this unconditional freedom.

However, this notion of liberty—as Øversveen (2022) and Block (2021) argue in their critiques of libertarian idealism—fails to account for the material and social preconditions of freedom. Bakunin's vision lacks a structural understanding of power and reduces historical struggle to moral voluntarism.

3.3 The Rejection of All Authority and the State

In pursuit of absolute personal freedom, Bakunin called for the total abolition of the state and all forms of authority. He claimed that the state, supposedly instituted under divine influence, was the origin of all social evil. Like Stirner, he fell into an idealist historical outlook, attributing the existence of capitalism entirely to the state, rather than to concrete relations of production. Thus, he argued that to abolish capitalism, one must first abolish the state. Lacking an understanding of the material conditions for dismantling state power, Bakunin instead promoted spontaneous uprisings led by “genius individuals” and marginalized groups such as lumpenproletariat and ruined peasants.

Bakunin went so far as to claim that the state could be eliminated “within twenty-four hours” by sheer force of will. His vision of an anarchist society entailed a condition where all individuals would exist in a stateless harmony, unbound by any authority. Yet such proclamations, as Dunayevskaya (2024) and Tarrit (2024) observe, ignore both historical contingency and the necessity of political organization in achieving liberation.

3.4 Sectarian Agitation and Organizational Sabotage

Bakunin's political actions revealed his commitment to undermining organized socialist movements. After joining the First International (International Workingmen's Association) in 1868, he paid lip service to Marx's leadership while secretly working to establish a rival organization—the Alliance of Socialist Democracy. He attempted to replace the International's *General Rules* with his anarchist principles, subverting the central leadership and advancing sectarian agendas.

In Spain and other Romance-speaking countries, Bakuninists formed branches based on his anarchist do-

ctrines. His followers in Spain, particularly during the revolutionary wave of 1868–1874, made anarchism the dominant socialist current. In 1871, Bakunin's Junta Federativa publicly denounced the General Council and advocated total local autonomy, labeling Marx a “statist authoritarian.” His sabotage of the International culminated in the 1872 Hague Congress, which ended in an irreparable split between Marxists and anarchists.

As Papanikolopoulos (2025) and Paget (2024) show in their analyses of anti-authoritarian movements, charismatic leadership and anti-structure rhetoric often become tools for factionalism, leading to fragmentation rather than cohesion. Bakunin's radical individualism and conspiratorial organizing tactics undermined proletarian unity and diverted the focus of the movement from material struggle to abstract polemic.

From the standpoint of dialectical materialism, Bakunin's concept of freedom must be understood as a metaphysical abstraction. He treats liberty as absolute, unconditional, and outside the bounds of historical laws and class dynamics. Like Stirner, he denies all authority, but with greater fervor and political consequence. Rather than grounding his politics in the lived realities of the proletariat or the structural conditions of capitalism, Bakunin elevates individual freedom to a transcendental principle, opposing it to all forms of social regulation. This leads him to reject the historical materialist view that class struggle is the engine of social transformation. As such, the confrontation between Marxism and Bakuninist anarchism was not only tactical but profoundly theoretical—and necessarily prolonged.

4. Marx and Engels' Critique of Anarchism: Stirner and Bakunin

4.1 Marx and Engels' Critique of Stirner's An-

archism

As the Young Hegelians increasingly focused on abstract philosophical categories such as “substance” and “self-consciousness” to theorize societal transformation, Marx grew sharply critical of what he saw as their illusionary methods. When the “Free Ones,” influenced by Stirner, reduced political struggle to a theatrical farce of egoistic revolt, Marx set himself the task of unmasking these delusions. Through a sustained critique of Stirner’s “Unique One,” Marx and Engels constructed a new worldview—philosophically grounded in materialism and politically aligned with socialism and communism.

4.1.1 From Abstract Ego to Real Individual: Critique of Stirner’s Philosophical Foundations

Marx and Engels identified Stirner’s “Unique One” as a speculative construct devoid of material grounding. In *The German Ideology*, Marx dismissed the egoist subject as “the offspring of idealism and realism,” a ghostly invention of thought, not a living person. Stirner, they argued, had merely shifted from abstract universals (like God or Man) to an equally abstract ego. His conception of the individual failed to recognize the material processes through which human beings live, labor, and relate.

Against Stirner’s self-enclosed ego, Marx and Engels proposed the “real individual” as the proper subject of history—someone engaged in concrete activities, embedded in social relations, and shaped by historical conditions. “We do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive,” Marx wrote, “but from real, active men... men as they actually are.” Real people are not fixed entities, but living beings developing through labor and interaction, and therefore, their consciousness and freedom emerge from within social and productive life.

This shift from metaphysical abstraction to historical practice marked a decisive turn in Marxist thought.

Stirner’s self-contained ego was an expression of bourgeois idealism; Marx’s materialist subject, by contrast, emerged from the world of production, reproduction, and political struggle.

4.1.2 Critique of Stirner’s Abstract Liberty: Freedom without Social Ground

Marx and Engels viewed Stirner’s notion of liberty as an empty abstraction. In his rejection of all external institutions—religion, morality, the state—Stirner celebrated a purely internal, psychological sovereignty.

He sought a “freedom of the self from the self,” where the individual would own himself absolutely and be beholden to nothing.

Yet such liberty, Marx argued, is a fantasy. It ignores the material and structural conditions of existence.

Freedom is not an internal state of mind but a relation between individuals and their world. Stirner’s ego, cut off from social relations and collective practice, cannot effect any real transformation. Instead, it masks the individual’s continued subjugation to economic and political forces.

In this way, Stirner inverts the relationship between body and spirit, turning the real world into a mere shadow of mental activity. By doing so, he reduces freedom to a subjective illusion, incapable of addressing the actual sources of alienation. As Øversveen (2022) notes, such disembodied freedom fails to confront the alienating structures of modern capitalism. Stirner’s egoist project therefore aligns not with emancipation, but with a petit-bourgeois retreat into self-isolation.

4.1.3 False Community versus Collective Liberation:

The “Union of Egoists” and the “Association of Free Individuals”

Stirner’s proposal for a “Union of Egoists” is perhaps the most glaring contradiction in his theory. While rejecting all forms of collectivity, he imagines a voluntary association of unique individuals united by self-interest. Yet such a union, built on isolated egos, lacks any durable foundation. Without shared purpose, mutual obligation, or historical substance, the “Union of Egoists” collapses into mere instrumentalism.

Marx and Engels contrasted this illusion with their vision of the “Association of Free Individuals”—a community grounded in social production, collective struggle, and common ownership. They held that real emancipation requires transforming the material conditions of life, abolishing private property, and overcoming the alienation produced by capitalism. Only then could individuals relate to one another as equals and co-creators of a shared world.

In the Marxist view, community is not a denial of individuality but its condition. “Only in the community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions,” Marx wrote. True freedom arises not from egoistic separation, but from solidarity, cooperation, and collective power. Thus, Marx and Engels not only dismantled Stirner’s philosophical edifice but advanced an alternative rooted in historical materialism and the praxis of revolution.

4.2 Marx and Engels’ Critique of Bakunin’s Anarchism

Bakunin’s anarchism posed a more immediate political challenge than Stirner’s philosophy. Marx and Engels opposed Bakunin’s calls for the immediate abolition of the state and all forms of authority, arguing that such proposals targeted a non-existent abstract

on rather than real social and political structures.

4.2.1 Idealist Freedom versus Historical Materialism

Bakunin defended a metaphysical view of “absolute freedom,” detached from historical and class realities.

He claimed that the highest human destiny lay in the realization of innate human nature through unrestricted individual liberty. However, Marx and Engels, employing historical materialism, contended that freedom can only be achieved through the transformation of exploitative social relations. As they put it, “We are dealing with real individuals, not imaginary ones.” Human freedom is shaped and constrained by the level of productive forces and material conditions. Without altering these, any notion of absolute freedom remains utopian.

4.2.2 Misunderstanding the State: Political Economy and Revolution

Bakunin inverted the relationship between base and superstructure, claiming that the state produces capital, and thus its abolition would lead to the disappearance of capitalism. Marx and Engels rebutted this, asserting that “By abolishing capital, we abolish the state.” Only through proletarian revolution and the socialization of the means of production can the state wither away. Bakunin’s approach ignores the role of class struggle, reducing revolution to a moral imperative rather than a historically conditioned necessity.

4.2.3 Misreading Authority: The Dialectic of Structure and Freedom

Bakunin equated all authority with oppression and opposed it to autonomy in absolute terms. Engels re

sponded with pragmatic examples in *On Authority*, illustrating that collective labor—whether in factories, railways, or ships—requires coordination and rule enforcement. Authority, he argued, is not inherently coercive but a product of necessary social organization. Over time, authority may evolve from coercive to consensual forms, but it cannot be abolished overnight without undermining collective functionality. “The Paris Commune failed,” Engels wrote, “because it lacked centralization and authority.”

4.2.4 Organizational Sabotage and the Struggle within the First International

Following Bakunin’s failed attempt to usurp leadership within the First International, Marx and Engels responded decisively. At the 1871 London Conference, they drafted *The Political Action of the Working Class* to counter Bakunin’s rejection of political struggle.

They also denounced his sectarian activities in *The Alleged Splits in the International* (1872) and collected extensive evidence against him. At the 1872 Hague Congress, Bakunin and his allies were expelled from the International. Despite continued resistance, Marx and Engels published *On Authority* and *The Alliance of Socialist Democracy and the International Working Men’s Association* to further discredit his influence. Their efforts preserved the revolutionary integrity of the workers’ international movement and safeguarded the principles of scientific socialism.

5. Conclusion

This study has examined the ideological confrontation between Marxism and two representative strands of anarchism: Stirner’s egoist philosophy and Bakunin’s activist insurrectionism. Through a close reading of Marx and Engels’ critiques, it becomes clear that both forms of anarchism, despite their differences, sh

are a common departure from materialist analysis and historical praxis.

Stirner’s conception of the “Unique One” is founded upon a metaphysical abstraction that disregards the social and historical conditions of human existence.

His vision of freedom, rooted in radical individualism and subjective will, dissolves into a solipsistic utopia devoid of social mediation or collective responsibility. Marx and Engels, in contrast, ground freedom in the real, social individual—situated in material production, shaped by social relations, and capable of collective transformation. Their critique reveals that any theory of liberty divorced from material conditions risks reinforcing, rather than overcoming, alienation and inequality.

Bakunin, while more politically engaged, similarly fails to transcend idealism. His call for the immediate abolition of the state overlooks the structural role of capital and class struggle in the formation of political power. He conflates all authority with oppression and elevates autonomy to a moral absolute, ignoring the dialectical interplay between collective organization and individual agency. Marx and Engels counter this with a nuanced understanding of historical development, the role of the proletariat, and the necessity of transitional forms of governance—such as the dictatorship of the proletariat—to achieve true emancipation.

The conflict between Marxism and anarchism within the First International thus represents more than an organizational dispute. It is a foundational debate about the nature of freedom, the function of the state, and the pathway to human liberation. Marx and Engels defended a vision of communism not as an abstract ideal, but as a real movement emerging from the contradictions of capitalism. Their insistence on grounding theory in historical materialism, revolutionary practice, and collective agency remains a vital counterpoint to both metaphysical escapism and anti

-political voluntarism.

In an age marked by renewed struggles over the meaning of freedom, the legitimacy of authority, and the future of collective life, revisiting the critiques of Stirner and Bakunin offers not only historical insight but theoretical resources for the present. Marx and Engels' materialist legacy continues to provide a framework through which liberation can be envisioned not as an isolated revolt, but as a social process rooted in solidarity, production, and historical change.

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